Many conflicts are not based on facts or actual conflicts of interest. Quite a few international disagreements are caused by misperceptions, misunderstandings and errors in thinking. Communication at the very least may help reveal misconceptions, which sometimes leads to reassessments or corrections.

The same can be applied to the current round of talks between South and North Korea and the USA. History never repeats itself, though the North-South Korean conflict is part of an ongoing greater East-West conflict. It is the result of a competition between the US sphere of interest and, on the other side of the table, China and Russia.

Every political situation is unique. Nevertheless, a re-examination of the East-West conflict in Europe and the “German-to-German” negotiations makes sense with regard to the talks held between the two Koreas. 


● Realists and ideologues

The West’s perception of communist Germany, better known as East Germany, closed itself off from the rest of the world. Some weeks before the wall came down, I was refused entry to East Berlin at the infamous checkpoint at Bahnhof Friedrichstrabe. The reason given was: “Attempt to introduce propaganda writings of the class enemy.” I had carelessly stuffed into my pocket a West Berlin cinema magazine.

Of course, this in no way can be compared with North Korea. Visits into East Germany by West Germans and West Berliners were permitted by the East Germany regime. It needed Western currency. Despite a media ban, West German television was avidly watched in East Germany. This included the communist leadership as well. This had become so widespread that the secret police, the Stasi, almost gave up trying to do anything about it.

However, one question remained until the fall of the East German regime: How well informed was the communist leadership regarding the state of their country as well as the state of the other side?

Following the collapse of East Germany, I met the board of a state-owned microchips company. During a visit by the communist leadership a few months before the fall of the Berlin Wall, East German television had broadcasted a propaganda report to showcase how communism was keenly keeping up with the capitalistic West in terms of cutting-edge technology. The head of research was now admitting: chips and machines had been purchased in the West, circumventing embargo regulations. Each chip was not the result of mass production but was individually made in the laboratory. Out of 100 chips, only 4 were usable.

To a certain degree, the leadership itself was being deceived simply because it wanted to be deceived. Everywhere in communist Germany, as in Russia at the time of Catherine the Great, “Potemkin villages” had been erected. Those who did not demonstrate “success” were not only in danger of losing their jobs but also of being sent to prison.

In fact, it continued this way until the economic and political collapse of East Germany. The majority of the Communist party leadership had a completely unrealistic image of the West, but this applied also to their own country. Others, like Gerhard Schurer, the head of the East German State Planning Commission, that I later met, had a clear and accurate view of the ailing communist economy. These equally applied to the head of the foreign intelligence division of the secret service (Stasi) Markus Wolf. These daring truthsayers, however, were accused internally of “not toeing the party line,” of being “dissenters” and even “sharing enemy views.” This group inside the party leadership was sidelined until the very end.

The strength of the factions among ideologists and dogmatists, on the one side, and realists, on the other, will also determine the talks with North Korea.


● Doves and hawks

The two factions of dogmatists and realists are not congruent with two additional factions: the doves and the hawks. At times they do overlap.

The group with its realistic view about how weak their own economy or military is that can arrive at two determinations: this weakness makes cooperation with the fiscally superior or military stronger opponent a necessity, and simultaneously the exact opposite behavior: their country’s economic failing induces restraint, a behavior assumed to prevent the opponent from seeing the truth of the matter and thus take advantage of it, and moreover exploit it in negotiations.

The recent sacking of three top military officials by Kim Jong-un some days ago does point in this direction.


The fate that awaited the communist leaders of the Soviet Union and East Germany

Securing something positive for one’s country is one thing. It, however, does not necessarily confer an advantage towards one’s own position. Any concessions made may draw fire from members of one’s own party and lead to dismissal. Hanging over the head of every person seated at the negotiating table is the Sword of Damocles, that could sever careers in one clean cut. Especially in a dictatorship, no one is safe from arbitrary decisions.

Everyone on the North Korean side has in the back of their mind one experience, even if there have been no executions or long prison sentences: No one wants to end up like the leaders of East Germany, most of the former communist countries of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Nearly all communist cadres saw their careers come to an end in 1990.

Khrushchev, the Communist party secretary of the Soviet Union and Stalin’s successor, experienced a similar fate 30 years earlier. As the hardliner who ordered the building of the Berlin Wall, he was criticized only a year later within his own communist party among other things for his rapprochement with capitalistic West Germany. Three years later, he was deposed.

Gorbachev also did not want to see communism come to an end. He simply wanted to reform and modernize the Soviet Union.


● China and the US

One thing must also be made clear: whether represented by individuals or not, Chinese and US leaders are always present at the negotiating table along with the two Korean delegations.

This too is an experience from the East-West German negotiations. Seated on one side of the negotiating table was always the Soviet Union and on the other the British, French and Americans. Their interests always had to be “taken into consideration,” even when the two Germanys were in agreement.


● The economic situation is the key

The key to a successful outcome of the talks is ultimately the economy. This insight is self-evident in capitalism, though it has also been the core of communist doctrine ever since Karl Marx.

An experience of the East-West negotiations should also be the key to success in the two Koreas talks: creating opportunities for economic cooperation. Looking back, it can be said for Europe: Political talks are important but trade even more so. “Change through trade” (“Wandel durch Handel”) was the aim at the time and became even a buzz word. Nothing’s changed today, it remains a recipe for success in which both sides win out.


Wolfgang J. Hummel

Wolfgang J. Hummel is a lecturer at the Technical University for Applied Sciences Berlin-Wildau.-- Ed.