The year is 1994. The United States and North Korea have just signed an agreement finalizing terms for denuclearization. No, this is not a piece of science fiction; it is something that actually happened. And yet, for some reason, North Korea remains today in possession of nuclear weapons. So what went wrong?

First, let’s recount what happened in 1993. That year, as a member of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), North Korea hosted inspectors from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The inspectors found irregularities in North Korean reports for nuclear waste, prompting the request to access two waste sites. This request was denied by Pyongyang, sparking the first North Korean nuclear crisis.

In the winter of 1993, Pyongyang threatened to withdraw from the NPT while soliciting Washington for a diplomatic solution to resolve that and other longstanding issues. At the top of the list for Pyongyang was relief from economic sanctions that had been in place since the end of the Korean War. The newly installed Clinton administration responded favorably, suspending “Team Spirit” military exercises with South Korea as a sign of good faith and negotiating what became known as the “Agreed Framework.”

The “Agreed Framework” held four provisions: 1) North Korea would halt its graphite-moderated nuclear reactors and allow inspectors back in, 2) the US would build two light-water nuclear reactors (which are more difficult to use for weapons development) to replace the graphite ones, 3) the US would provide oil as an alternative energy source in the interim, and 4) both sides would move to establish full normalization of diplomatic and economic relations.

For its part, North Korea made good on its promise to suspend nuclear activity, allowing IAEA inspectors back in. The Clinton administration, on the other hand, was hampered by the surprise victory of Republicans, who retook control of Congress in 1994 for the first time in 42 years. The Republicans were in staunch opposition of the Framework and opposed it at every turn, making it difficult for the White House to secure funding. This resulted in substantial delays in both the delivery of oil and planning for the light-water reactors. At one point, funding for the reactors became so untenable that South Korea and Japan stepped in, agreeing to foot the $4.5 billion bill.

The provision most important to Pyongyang, relief from economic sanctions, was something the Clinton administration failed to deliver entirely, resulting in the secret resumption of nuclear activity by North Korea in late 1998. By all accounts, this resumption was something Washington knew about at the time.

It is interesting to note how most US media accounts do not reference anything about the clash between Congressional Republicans and the Clinton administration. In fact, most timelines in US media just jump from 1994 to 1998, implying North Korea was to blame for the Framework’s collapse. This contradicts testimony delivered to Congress prior to North Korean resumption of activity when US officials, led by Rust Deming, openly declared that both the US and IAEA were satisfied that there had been “no fundamental violation of any aspect of the framework agreement” by North Korea.

Those who have been paying attention to the Iran nuclear deal can see troublesome similarities. In both cases, the President of the United States formally agreed to terms that his Congress failed to support. This shows that presidential approval alone is not enough. And herein lies the danger.

Given Trump’s history as a compulsive attention-getter, there arises the concern that he might pursue a North Korean nuclear deal solely for the prestige, knowing full well that Congress will not actually implement anything he signs. This could allow Trump to be viewed as global peacemaker without having to suffer any consequences for the deal’s implementation. I fear a shrewd businessman like Trump will recognize such an opportunity and possibly misuse it for personal gain.


Justin Fendos
Justin Fendos is a professor at Dongseo University in South Korea and the associate director of the Tan School at Fudan University in Shanghai. -- Ed.