On July 4th, America’s Independence Day, North Korea claimed that it had successfully launched an intercontinental ballistic missile. What is self-evident now is that its weapons of mass destruction programs pose a clear and present danger to the world community. Mutual blame games aside, North Korea’s WMD threats are no longer local, but global.

At this juncture, North Korean observers are roughly divided into two groups. At one end are those who advocate that Kim Jong-un and his cohorts will never abandon WMDs, which is the last hope for his regime’s survival. At the other end are those who believe they will abandon them if coercive persuasion or force is applied

For the moment, the former seems to prevail. But such advocacy is not a policy, but defeatism. In this age of cyber-electronic thermonuclear warfare, war is not a continuation of diplomacy by other means, but a failure of global political leadership. Hence, the latter believes the correct coercive diplomacy with global leadership can avoid inadvertent war, and make for a win-win policy deal for Korea’s two halves and other concerned countries as well.

To begin with, the Korean question has two components conceptually. One is the ultimate objective; that is, reuniting Korea. The other is the ways and means of realizing it. The ultimate goal was stipulated in the Cairo Declaration on Dec. 1, 1943, by US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, Chiang Kai-shek and Winston Churchill. Namely, “mindful of the enslavement of the Korean people” under the Japanese colonial rule that “in due course Korea shall become free and independent.”

Seventy-four years after this declaration, Korea remains divided, with the North shooting off ballistic missiles and tinkering with nuclear tests. The supreme irony is that South Korea is a member of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and a donor nation. North Korea, notwithstanding its WMDs, is one of the poorest recipient states.

To deal with the Kim Jong-un’s reckless nuclear and missile brandishing, the catchword of the new US administration’s North Korea policy under Donald Trump is “maximum pressure and engagement.” 

The new South Korean government’s North Korea policy under Moon Jae-in was announced in his speech on July 7, 2017, at the Korber Foundation in Berlin. In essence, his policy is proactive engagement with the North with a proviso that the Korean Peninsula must be denuclearized in the end.

At first glance, the North Korea policies of Moon and Trump seem different. At a closer look, however, the Moon and Trump North Korea policies are complementary. Both nations are seriously committed to resolving North Korean WMD threats and unraveling the Korean Gordian knot.

Differently put, Korean reunification is the ultimate aim of every Korean and freedom-loving person around the world. But North Korea’s WMDs are the greatest obstacles in its path to achieving this goal.

The Moon government is taking a step-by-step approach. It is ready to ease tensions in inter-Korean relations by reinitiating the meeting of separated families, resuming sports and cultural exchanges, as well as putting a stop to excessive provocative activities along the Demilitarized Zone.

Simultaneously, until and unless North Korea irrevocably dismantles the WMD program, the Moon government must actively impose a variety of sanctions against North Korea. It must do so in close coordination with the United States, our only treaty ally, along with Japan, China, Russia and all of the UN, Association of Southeast Asian Nations and EU member states.

Before offering my policy alternative to denuclearize the Korean Peninsula, let me first put this issue in a proper perspective. Four points are noteworthy.

One, several countries have abandoned either nuclear weapons or nuclear development programs. For example, South Africa destroyed its nuclear bombs in 1989. In the aftermath of the demise of the Soviet Union, Ukraine dismantled its nuclear arsenals and joined the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1994. 

Libya’s Moammar Gadhafi stopped its nuclear weapons development programs in 2003. At the moment, Iran is in the process of fulfilling the Joint Plan of Action agreed to on July 15, 2015 with the UN Security Council five permanent member states (P5) plus Germany and the EU.

Two, Israel, India and Pakistan, three de facto nuclear states, joined the UN International Atomic Energy Agency in 1957. But they did not sign the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation on Nuclear Weapons or Safeguards Agreement.

Three, the UN Security Council P5 joined the IAEA in 1957, except for China which joined it in 1984. Also, the NPT was ratified by the UK in 1968 and the US and Russia (then the Soviet Union) in 1970 while China and France only acceded in 1992.

Four, North Korea joined the IAEA in 1974 and NPT in 1985 and signed its SA in 1992. But starting with its withdrawal from the IAEA in 1994 and the NPT in 2003, North Korea has been the only country that continues to be in or out of the IAEA and that has allowed or refused to have IAEA safeguards in its nuclear facilities. North Korea’s compliance has been unreliable.

Thus, if the ongoing sanctions prove ineffective in dismantling North Korea’s WMD programs, the best available alternative framework for denuclearizing the Korean Peninsula may be a modified Iranian version of the Joint Plan of Action. Specifically, talks by the UN P5 plus Japan and ASEAN representatives with South Korea and the North Korea may be the answer.

Yes, North Korea is not Iran. Every nuclear conundrum is unique. And yet, North Korea’s WMD threats are now far more apocalyptic than any other menace on Earth.

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By Yang Sung-chul

Yang Sung-chul is former South Korea ambassador to the United States and senior adviser of the Kim Dae-Jung Peace Foundation. -- Ed.