During his first Asia visit as US Secretary of State, Rex Tillerson made clear the Trump Administration’s intentions of abandoning prior American approaches to North Korea and adopting a hard line against the rogue state. Secretary Tillerson’s public and firm remarks were crafted for one purpose: to exact from Beijing necessary measures to reign in North Korea’s nuclear program.

Tillerson’s March 17 statement in Seoul -- that all options are on the table and pre-emptive US military action against North Korea may be necessary if the threat from its weapons program reaches a certain level -- was used as a blunt instrument to end over two decades of failed US policy on North Korea. 

This new approach is a reaction to President Obama’s refusal to negotiate with Pyongyang in the absence of a commitment to back off its nuclear program, a strategy that fell short in stopping the regime’s efforts to develop nuclear weapons, as had President Bush’s efforts over a decade ago.

China’s unique role in propping up neighboring North Korea is well known. Beijing’s decadeslong policy of exerting broad influence over Pyongyang and supporting its regime reflects its strategic decision to maintain the status quo of a North Korean buffer state out of territorial sovereignty concerns. The idea of a reunified Korean peninsula under control by US ally Seoul is anathema to Beijing, as is the prospect of a flood of North Korean refugees into China following a potential collapse of the country’s rule.

Maddeningly for Washington, Beijing’s interests with Pyongyang continue to be at odds with US imperatives on the Korean Peninsula. This is exacerbated by the North’s progress in developing capabilities to weaponize ballistic missiles for conducting nuclear strikes on the US west coast and American bases in the Pacific, presenting an unacceptable risk to a growing number of policymakers in Washington. (In 2016 alone, North Korea conducted 21 missile launches and two nuclear tests.)

Taking into consideration Secretary Tillerson’s targeted messaging at China during his March 17 comments about Washington’s new posture towards Pyongyang, going forward US policy towards North Korea’s nuclear program may unfold in the following ways:

THAAD: Accompanying Tillerson’s statements is the installation of the US Army’s anti-ballistic missile system, Terminal High Altitude Area Defense, in South Korea over objections by Beijing. While Washington and Seoul have explained that THAAD is necessary to counter North Korean aggression, Beijing has opposed the defensive missile system, fearing it can be used against them and may disrupt the power balance in the region.

To bolster its case for THAAD’s necessity, the Trump administration may up the ante, arguing that Beijing’s intransigence on the North Korean issue has had consequences, namely, THAAD’s installation itself.

Deploying additional US assets: Some have opined that the Trump administration may yet go further by threatening to also station THAAD in Japan, rotate Ohio-class ballistic-missile submarines in regional waters and reinstall nuclear weapons at US-operated Kunsan Air Base in South Korea, all while arguing that these measures -- while not aimed at China -- are taken out of necessity due to North Korea’s unrestrained conduct and Beijing’s refusal to clamp down on Pyongyang.

This amid Foal Eagle 2017, the US-South Korean annual military joint drills that commenced this month, and after reports that the Trump administration plans to send B-52 nuclear bombers to South Korea following Pyongyang’s Feb. 11 missile test.

Trade war and sanctions: Despite the inevitable costs to the American economy, some analysts have argued for a US trade war, the levying of secondary sanctions on China and the cessation of the US-China bilateral investment treaty negotiations as ways to exact action by Beijing on North Korea. Such measures, it is explained, would use the economic leverage of the US to impose a cost on Chinese inaction on the issue, forcing Beijing to cooperate when the price of not cooperating becomes inhibitive.

Others have argued against a trade war, instead advocating targeted sanctions against Chinese companies, banks and actors involved in North Korea’s nuclear program and human rights abuses, accompanied by the threat of tariffs on select goods.

Washington’s new, hardened approach towards North Korea brings dynamics on the Korean peninsula and the region to a new phase. As President Trump at times prefers to keep his cards close to his chest, it is unclear whether Secretary Tillerson’s remarks serve as initial positioning in negotiations or as actual first steps towards resolving the North Korean nuclear problem through force of arms.

Either way, Washington’s intended audience, Beijing, is watching closely.

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By Ted Gover

Ted Gover, Ph.D. is instructor of political science at Central Texas College, US Marine Corps Base Camp Pendleton, California. -- Ed.