I wrote an article titled “How to Deal with the North Korean Nuclear Threat” in the Oct. 20 issue of The Korea Herald. In the article I reviewed two contrasting approaches advocated by various experts and political leaders in both South Korea and the US: negotiations and confrontation.

I argued that unless South Korea and the US have accurate intelligence on the nature and strength of the Kim Jong-un leadership, the degree of advancement and location of the North Korean nuclear warheads and their launching apparatus, it is impossible to choose the right strategy.

But we can no longer wait until South Korea and the US obtain all the necessary intelligence on these matters, because their double-edged policy -- the preconditions for negotiations and UN economic sanctions -- are incapable of making North Korea abandon its nuclear and missile programs. The longer they wait, the more uncompromising North Korea will become. Unless all UN members, particularly the US, China and Russia, impose complete economic and other sanctions, the North Korean regime will be able to survive. Some suggest that the overthrow of the Kim dynasty through a kind of palace coup is a better solution.

But it is a very risky operation, mainly because the North Korean leader and his Praetorian Guard are most likely to have a contingency plan for such a situation. Moreover, in such a situation China is most likely to intervene.

When Trump tweeted, “It won’t happen!” referring to Kim Jong-un’s remark in his New Year’s message that North Korea is in the final stage of developing an intercontinental ballistic missile capable of reaching the US continent, many people thought that among his options he would not exclude a pre-emptive attack against the North Korean nuclear facilities. Even if it is possible, it is highly risky, because some North Korean nuclear weapons might survive and be used to counterattack.

The above suggests that unconditional negotiations between the US and North Korea are the only option. After the failure of the six-party talks in 2008, the US decided that it would come to the negotiating table only on the condition that North Korea makes a prior commitment to abandon its nuclear and missile programs. South Korea took the same position.

However, if we review the demands and quid pro quo made by both sides during the six-party talks between August 2003 and July 2008, we find that the US and South Korea had not made any concessions on North Korea’s demands. It had two demands: the simultaneous realization of the denuclearization of North Korea and a peace treaty between the US and North Korea to replace the 1953 cease-fire agreement, and the cessation of the US-ROK annual military exercises. It specified that the peace treaty should include the withdrawal of US troops stationed in South Korea and the establishment of diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea.

North Korea still makes the same demands the subject of negotiations. The US held that only after North Korea abandons its own nuclear and missile systems, it can issue a written guarantee on non-aggression, not a peace treaty. Another interesting finding is that the six-party talks agreed to establish five working groups: denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, normalization of the diplomatic relations between the US and North Korea, normalization of the diplomatic relations between Japan and North Korea, economic and energy cooperation, and the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism.

This indicates that only after its denuclearization can North Korea normalize relations with the US and Japan and a Northeast Asian Peace and Secularity Mechanism -- not a US-North Korea peace treaty -- will guarantee peace in the Korean Peninsula. It should be also noted that the second six-party talks in 2003 adopted a three-stage process rule (commitment, commencement and completion) proposed by South Korea.

South Korea should take the initiative and ask the US to conclude a peace treaty with North Korea which would include the withdrawal of US ground troops in Korea and the establishment of diplomatic relations on the condition that the ROK-US alliance and the US commitment to protect South Korea through a nuclear umbrella remain intact. The US troops will be withdrawn gradually as South Korea builds self-sufficient military forces over a fixed period of time. South Korea also needs the US nuclear umbrella because China, as a partner of the Sino-North Korean alliance, could provide its nuclear umbrella to North Korea.

On the other hand, the peace treaty between the US and North Korea should be concluded according to the three-stage process rule. According to this negotiating process, when North Korea expresses the willingness to abandon its nuclear programs, the US expresses the willingness to offer its written security guarantee. Next, when North Korea begins to abandon its nuclear programs, the US gives it a temporary written security guarantee. Finally, when North Korea completes the dismantlement of its nuclear programs, the US concludes a permanent peace treaty with North Korea. This is to ensure that North Korea would not betray or cheat the US any longer.

Six-party or four-party talks should be held for the establishment of the Northeast Asian Peace and Security Mechanism after -- not before -- the US-North Korea peace treaty is concluded. If North Korea rejects this proposal, there is no other option but a confrontational approach.


By Park Sang-seek

Park Sang-seek is a former rector of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies at Kyung Hee University and the author of “Globalized Korea and Localized Globe.” He can be reached at parksangseek@hotmail.com. -- Ed.