On Aug. 25, the Ministry of Health and Welfare announced a series of measures aimed at raising South Korea’s low birthrate by 2020. The measures focused on changing the workplace culture so that people will have more time to spend with their families, which should encourage them to have more children. The government also promised to increase support for infertility treatment and increasing paternity allowances for parents who have a second child. The government hopes to raise the fertility rate from the current 1.24 babies per woman to 1.5 by 2020.

The government is focusing its efforts on changing Korean workplace culture while providing financial support for childbirth. Though better than nothing, these efforts do not address deep structural issues that depress fertility in South Korea, which suggests that the government does not have an accurate understanding of the problem.

In a global context, the decline in the fertility rate in South Korea fits the pattern found in other advanced industrial democracies. The most influential factor on the birthrates is the process of industrialization and urbanization. As people leave the land and move to crowded, booming cities, the fertility rate declines rapidly. South Korea experienced rapid industrialization and urbanization from the 1960s to the 1980s and the birthrate declined dramatically. Most other advanced industrial democracies have low birthrates, and will soon find their populations declining. Germany, Italy and Japan already have shrinking populations.

Statistics on fertility rates reveal some interesting patterns. According to the 2015 edition of the US CIA World Factbook, South Korea, with a fertility rate of 1.25, ranks 220 among the 224 sovereign states and countries surveyed. Only Hong Kong, Taiwan, Macau and Singapore rank lower. With the exception of Japan and Cuba, the nations ranking below the government’s 2020 target of 1.5 are all European, including the populous nations of Germany, Italy, and Spain. The estimated fertility rate for population replacement without immigration is 2.10, and only France at 2.08 comes close to that level. Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, the UK and the US have fertility rates between 1.8 and 2.0.

The important point for South Korea is the variance in fertility rate among the advanced industrial democracies. Nations with fairly high fertility rates that welcome immigration, such as France, the UK and the US, are able to keep their population growing, which mitigates the negative economic and social effects of an aging population. Norway and Sweden are more homogeneous societies, but have an extensive system of social welfare benefits that has helped keep fertility rates high.

Compared with these nations, South Korea is hindered by the lack of immigrants and a weak social system. In the late 2000s, “multiculturalism” became a buzzword in Korea as the number of Koreans marrying foreign spouses increased, but the proportion of foreign nationals living permanently in Korea remains much smaller than other advanced industrial democracies, with the exception of Japan. Korea still defines itself as an ethno-national state, which makes it hard to develop a consensus in favor of immigration.

The weakness of the social system in South Korea is often cited as the leading cause the high rate of senior citizen poverty. The weak social system means that people feel pressure to save money for future expenses that would ordinarily be covered by social welfare in other countries. The pressure is strongest regarding education.

Koreans have often told me that raising children is extremely difficult. When asked why, they almost unanimously cite the cost of education. When asked further, the reply usually focuses on the cost of nursery school, private tutoring, and later university tuition. The assumption that children require continuous financial support combined with the high cost of housing in Seoul saps the confidence of young people, which causes a delay in marriage and subsequent decline in fertility.

Perception is important here. The pension system is weak, but South Korea has affordable universal health care, an extensive public education a system, and a comparatively low tax burden on the middle class. Housing outside of Seoul is not that expensive, and Seoul is more affordable than London or New York.

The problem is that young Koreans believe that they have to live in Seoul and provide additional education to ensure that their children will be able to compete in life. If they lack confidence in being able to provide good life chances for their children, then they would rather not have them.

To improve the fertility rate, the government needs to move away from vague “cultural” arguments and focus on policies that reduce the perceived as well as actual financial burden of raising children. More investment in public education, including early childhood, would be a good place to start.

By Robert J. Fouser

Robert J. Fouser, a former associate professor of Korean language education at Seoul National University, writes on Korea from Ann Arbor, Michigan. -- Ed.