In democratic countries the contest in politics mainly takes place between conservative and liberal forces. When the ideological spectrum in a democracy is divided into the conservative, moderate and liberal camps and power shifts from one camp to another smoothly, the country enjoys political stability. But if these three political forces either weaken or turn into extreme left or right forces, or become threatened by them, the country suffers from political turmoil.

When the Republic of Korea was established in 1948, its political system was modeled on the American presidential system. But the first government turned into a civilian dictatorship. This civilian dictatorship was overthrown by the students’ uprising in 1960. Since then Korea went through military or quasi-military dictatorships for 25 years until 1993 and finally returned to the original form of democracy, and has been preserving in it for the last 22 years. In this sense, Korea is a newly democratized country. The concept of NDCs is comparable to that of the newly industrialized countries in the 1970s. South Korea is no longer a NIC; it is a developed country. Our question is whether it can become a developed democratic state as Western democratic countries.

There are both favorable and unfavorable traits for DDCs in Korean political culture. The following are the favorable conditions for DDCs.

First, in South Korea the people are divided into three major ideological groups -- conservative, liberal (progressive) and moderate. This ideological structure has been relatively stable and the three forces have maintained a balance of power. The liberal and conservative parties have ruled the country alternatively for the last 22 years without serious upheavals.  

Second, there is general consensus among people on extremist ideologies: They oppose communism and any kind of dictatorship. The South Korean people have experienced the Korean War and protected democracy from civilian and military dictatorships with blood and tears. Moreover, they are confronted with communist North Korea. Hence, there is no room for communism and right-wing extremism in Korean politics. The constitution outlaws the right and left extremist political parties.

Third, South Korea opposes any kind of big power domination. It rejects Chinese, Japanese and Russian domination. It can never forget how these great powers tried to dominate the Korean peninsula during the Joseon era. This is the reason South Korea pursues “the policy of countering big neighbors by befriending distant powers.” There is general consensus on this policy, although there are disagreements on whether and when South Korea should pursue an equidistance policy or a closer policy toward any particular power to maintain a balance of power. 

Fourth, age and income influence people’s political ideology, party affiliation and major national issues in democracies. In developed democracies, the younger generations are more liberal, while the older generations are more conservative. On the other hand, the low- and lower-middle-class people are more likely to be liberal, while the upper class people are more likely to be conservative. In contrast, in South Korea age cohorts are much less important than their historical experiences. In other words, if a person has experienced Japanese colonialism, the Korean War or the April 19 Student Uprising, it will seriously affect his or her political ideology or party affiliation. On the other hand, the lower class of people are almost as conservative as the upper class and support conservative parties. It seems that the lower class’ antagonism toward the upper class is diluted by its fear of communism and a strong desire and belief that it can benefit from rapid economic development and through hard work rather than radical labor movements.

Fifth, the class structure is still in an incipient stage and fluid. People in general still hold the Korean dream that if you work hard, you can move up to a higher class. A coalition of the political, economic and military elites as the ruling class does not exist. If it emerges, Korean democracy will become seriously unstable.

On the other hand, some unfavorable conditions for the developed democratic state persist or are emerging.

First, the conservative people and parties tend to support a hard policy toward North Korea, while the liberal people and parties are generally in favor of a soft policy. This is the reason some scholars and polltakers use people’s preferred North Korea policy as one important indicator for determining their preferred ideology and political party. However, the North Korea issue is directly related to the raison d’etre of the Republic of Korea, and therefore the North Korea policy should be separated from ordinary domestic and diplomatic issues and should not be subject to party politics. For this purpose, the government in power should pursue a bipartisan policy toward North Korea. The bipolarization of politics in dealing with North Korea only benefits the North Korean regime.

Second, since the 1990s the egg-shaped class structure has become more pyramidal. The high income class and the low income class have increased, but the middle income class (the largest class) has decreased. More middle-class people have moved down to the lower class than moved up to the upper class. This also means the upper class has become richer, the other classes poorer and that a typical capitalist class structure is emerging. At the same time, class consciousness is becoming stronger.

Third, factional politics and regionalism are becoming more serious. The factional power struggle among parties has become very similar to the factional struggle within the ruling class during the Joseon era. Regionalism has penetrated every aspect of society. It has not yet become taboo, but a subconscious nature.

When and if the Korean people strengthen the favorable conditions and overcome the unfavorable conditions, South Korea will be able to join the club of developed democratic countries.

By Park Sang-seek

Park Sang-seek is a former rector of the Graduate Institute of Peace Studies, Kyung Hee University and the author of “Globalized Korea and Localized Globe.” --Ed.