A survey conducted by the Japanese government last year showed that more than 66 percent of Japanese citizens perceived South Korea negatively. This proportion, up from 58 percent in 2013, was the highest since Tokyo began the survey in 1978.

Despite the growing anti-Korean sentiment in Japan, the number of South Korean travelers to the country last year rose to the highest level in seven years. This flow is expected to further increase this year, as more South koreans take advantage of the weaker yen. But it is still unlikely to be accompanied by an easing of the high-running anti-Japanese sentiment here.

What we may infer from ordinary South Koreans’ separation of practical interest from negative emotion is that prolonged diplomatic friction between the two neighboring countries should not and cannot be allowed to frame their overall ties. The decreasing number of Japanese tourists here may also have little to do with strained relations between Seoul and Tokyo, and simply be a result of the steep appreciation of the won against the yen.

Politicians and diplomats in both countries should be more sincere and determined to break the deadlock in ties that have plunged to their lowest ebb in years.

In June, the two sides will mark the 50th year since relations were normalized two decades after the Korean Peninsula was liberated from Japan’s harsh colonial rule in 1945. In the lead-up to the anniversary, more light should be shed on the benefits of bilateral cooperation based on the 1965 basic agreement. At the same time, more sincere discussions should be held on how to prevent or contain political calculations from standing in the way of enhancing overall ties in the best interest of the two countries’ peoples.

An amicable atmosphere forged by the 1998 announcement of a new partnership by the late South Korean President Kim Dae-jung and then-Japanese Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi was short-lived. Since then, bilateral ties have deteriorated, with Kim’s successors having initially stressed forward-looking cooperation between the two countries only to find themselves in an intense confrontation with Tokyo during their late years in office.

Besides right-wing Japanese politicians, some South Korean leaders might have unnecessarily used undiplomatic rhetoric directed at a domestic audience, exacerbating tensions. What needs to be noted now is that the revisionist course taken by Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe may reflect a shift in the prevailing sentiment in Japanese society. Last month’s general election consolidated Abe’s position, though some commentators attributed his party’s victory to the lack of a credible opposition and the low voter turnout.

In this setting, it may become increasingly difficult for Seoul to repeatedly call for Tokyo to repent and apologize for its pre-1945 wartime atrocities. South Korea now needs to see Japan as it is, not as it should be. The time may be up for the two sides to play tug of war over how to weave historical liabilities with future partnership.

This standpoint should lead Seoul to take a more realistic and cool-headed approach to settling a set of pending issues with Tokyo, based on a precise assessment of practical interest, as many South Korean tourists have already been doing.