It is not unusual for chiefs of the spy agency to be convicted of politically motivated crimes when they leave office. Many of them have been indicted, with or without physical detention, and sentenced to prison terms, although some of them are suspended.

Won Sei-hoon, director of the National Intelligence Service from February 2009 to February this year, is following the footsteps of his disgraced predecessors. That is most unfortunate for the nation as well as Won.

On Friday, the prosecution indicted him on charges of attempting to influence the outcome of the parliamentary election in April last year and the presidential election in December. However, the prosecution did not seek a warrant for his pretrial detention, reportedly under undue pressure from the justice minister.

The prosecution said Won ordered the NIS to intervene in the elections when he told senior officials of the spy agency on Feb. 17, 2012, that pro-Pyongyang political forces in South Korea were attempting to take power in alliance with North Korea. Won allegedly warned that if they should win the elections, the National Intelligence Service would cease to exist.

He had since made similar remarks, calling on his staff to take preemptive action against opposition forces that he regarded as pro-Pyongyang, the prosecution said. Among them was his June 15 remark the prosecution quoted: “We should feel ashamed that so many who are blindly following the North were elected to the National Assembly. We’ll have to strive to keep them from taking root in our society.”

Now the court will have to determine if he violated the election law, which prohibits government officials from exercising their influence on an election. However, bringing one wayward chief to justice will not be enough to keep the National Intelligence Service from meddling in domestic politics. The conviction of so many former chiefs in the past attests to a need for the agency’s institutional changes.

The problem begins with the law governing the National Intelligence Agency, which permits the agency to collect intelligence, both in the nation and overseas. It is worth pondering a proposal to limit collectible domestic intelligence to that which is concerned about North Korea’s espionage activities and closely linked intelligence gathered overseas. Or, the National Assembly may revise the law to put the domestic operations of the spy agency under its scrutiny.

Another viable proposal is to prevent the president from handpicking a director nominee from among those most loyal to him. The idea is to allow a committee of competent intelligence experts and others to recommend two or three potential candidates so that the president will be able to pick one of them.

Ultimately, however, it is the president that can best ensure that the spy agency remain politically neutral. What the president needs to do is overcome the temptation to use the spy agency to advance a political agenda. A good example was set by former President Roh Moo-hyun, who publicly committed himself against exploiting the NIS for political purposes.