North Korea’s new leadership began showing raw bellicosity toward the South Korean government immediately after the mourning period for Kim Jong-il. Key state organizations issued statements attacking President Lee Myung-bak and the ruling group in Seoul for deterring South Koreans from paying tribute to the dead North Korean leader. A joint editorial of major official newspapers on the New Year’s Day also condemned the “traitors” in the South for their “inhuman and anti-national acts.”

This was not unexpected, but we would rather interpret the virulent words released from Pyongyang as signs of weakness on the part of whoever manages the dynastic power transition. Installing an unprepared young heir as the ruler of 24 million people cannot be as easy as staging a majestic funeral ceremony. They are again blaming the South to divert public attention from a process that lacks legal, moral and political legitimacy.

On Dec. 30, 2011, Kim Jong-un was appointed as the supreme commander of the North Korean People’s Army, one of the multiple titles his father had until his death on Dec. 17. The next steps will be confirming the new leader as the chairman of the National Defense Commission, the most powerful position in the North’s governing system under the April 2010 revision of the DPRK constitution, and then making him the general secretary of the Workers’ Party.

Pyongyang media reported that Kim Jong-un’s appointment as KPA chief was decided in a meeting of the political bureau of the central committee of the ruling Workers’ Party. It was announced that the decision was made in accordance with Kim Jong-il’s instructions on Oct. 8, more than two months before his death.

Under the DPRK constitution, the chairman of the National Defense Commission has the power of appointing or removing “major senior officials” in the area of defense. Instead of clarifying how the exclusive power of the NDC chairman was exercised by the party politburo, the North Korean announcement simply attributed the process to Kim Jong-il’s “yuhun,” which literally means “instruction upon death.” No other contents of the so-called yuhun were revealed.

Even if North Koreans are already well accustomed to such legal defects in governance, anyone with normal sense cannot ignore the moral and political impropriety involved in the inheritance of state power. The people’s will is completely ignored and absolutely no efforts are made even to fake political representation common in modern states to justify the father-to-son power transition. Everything is attributed to the mysterious “yuhun.” But the new leadership in Pyongyang seems to know the risk in this process.

The joint editorial of major newspapers, which serves as a New Year policy statement of the government in Pyongyang, stressed that the “entire party, armed forces and people should support Comrade Kim Jong-un with life-devoting loyalty,” following the party’s lead. The military should strengthen political programs to establish the unitary control system of the supreme commander, Kim Jong-un, and the Workers’ Party should also strive to solidify the unitary leadership, the article emphasized.

Kim Jong-un, 29, wears a hairstyle that strikingly resembles that of his grandfather, who first appeared as a 33-year-old guerrilla leader in 1945, escorted by Soviet forces. During the funeral, he had on a double-buttoned overcoat that also reminded the DPRK founder, who is deified as the eternal ruler of the communist state in the preamble of the “Kim Il-sung Constitution.”

Yet, the ruling clique is aware that this symbolism alone cannot guarantee stability of the regime. Experiences over the past decades tell them that the best means to maintain internal control is emphasizing the threats posed by the eternal enemy, the United States, and its “puppets” in the South. For the first time since 2007, the joint editorial demanded the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Korea.

Throughout 2012, we have to brace ourselves for various provocations posed by a fragile regime in the North as it struggles to survive against multiple internal challenges. At the moment, Pyongyang strategists have chosen to harass the conservative government in Seoul, expecting favorable offers from the liberal camp in forthcoming election campaigns. Parties are called on to respond in the most considerate manner, closely watching how Operation Reincarnation works in the North.