MELBOURNE ― The Western Pacific is currently facing a difficult problem: how to accommodate China’s rising aspirations in a region where the United States has held primacy since the Cold War’s end. Is the U.S. determined to maintain dominance in the Asia/Pacific region? Or is it willing to operate through multilateral forums that allow all involved parties to help set the rules? The way this issue unfolds will determine whether peace will continue to prevail across the Pacific.

It is hard to see the stationing of 2,500 U.S. marines in Darwin, Australia ― a decision announced by U.S. President Barack Obama on his recent tour of Asia ― as anything more than a symbolic gesture, a provocative reminder that the U.S. is determined to stay in the region. America’s purpose, however, remains unclear.

Across the Asia/Pacific region, the rise of China is welcome, but on the condition that China plays by internationally-accepted rules. That dictum, of course, should apply to everyone. But tensions will inevitably arise if China has no say in the creation of these rules.

It is difficult to predict America’s on-going role in the region. China’s economic and military power is rising. The U.S., on the other hand, continues to dominate militarily, while its former economic influence is diminishing. In any case, China will invariably respond harshly to U.S. efforts to step up its military presence in the region. Containing China is not the answer to Asia’s security questions.

The Korean peninsula, Taiwan, and the South China Sea’s islands and sea lanes are all areas of potential dispute between the U.S. and China. But, while important, both sides should make diplomatic efforts to minimize Sino-American rivalry over these areas and avoid embarking on a new Cold War.

Under current conditions, responding to China’s rise with military force will be unwelcome. China is modernizing its military and intends to become a significant sea power, which is provoking many China-observers to call for greater transparency. But it is doubtful that the U.S. offers China much transparency about its own new generation of weapons. To put the issue in perspective, the U.S. military budget constitutes 43 percent of the world’s total. China’s expenditure represents a little over 7 percent.

No power will talk openly about military capability except in the broadest terms. Too many forget that China’s nuclear force is a deterrent only ― far too small to be a first-strike force. And China is among the first countries prepared to make a no-first-use of nuclear arms pledge, provided other nuclear powers reciprocate.

China has demonstrated no interest in emulating either the nineteenth-century’s European imperial powers, or Japan’s early twentieth-century imperial efforts. The anxiety that China does have such ambitions ignores the country’s history. On the contrary, China remembers all too painfully the unequal treaties imposed by the western powers on China and Japan in the nineteenth and early-twentieth centuries. An alliance between the U.S., Japan, Australia, and possibly India designed to contain China must not materialize.

The agreement recently announced by the defense ministers of Japan and India will likely be regarded by China as a response by these countries to United States pressure. It will again suggest that a policy of containment is unfortunately being broadly pursued. This Cold War concept would be inimical to peaceful development in the Western Pacific.

While the historical background is important, the West’s strategic position depends upon today’s actions. For example, China has helped ― maybe not enough ― with the problems presented by North Korea. To reduce tensions in the region, perhaps the U.S. should initiate the long-avoided direct talks with North Korea that could help to resolve the security issues posed by that country’s regime.

Furthermore, the international court should resolve the Spratly Islands dispute. A group of islands in the South China Sea claimed by China, Taiwan, Vietnam, the Philippines, Malaysia, and Brunei, the Spratly Islands are valuable because of their oil reserves and their commercial fishing industry. It is critical that the countries contesting sovereignty over the islands abide by the court’s decision and commit to keeping the international sea lanes open.

Political philosopher Joseph Nye’s concept of soft power ― diplomacy, not force of arms ― is the best method of pursuing these objectives. Diplomacy needs to be backed by strength, but the U.S. has plenty without militarizing Asia and the Pacific more than it already has. The peaceful resolution of these conflicts depends upon China having a role in the decision-making process, but this will require the U.S. to step back and forego its desire for primacy in the region. And it will require the same of China.

During the first Taiwan Strait Crisis in 1954, China began shelling the offshore islands Quemoy and Matsu, threatening to “liberate” Taiwan. As the U.S. contemplated a possible nuclear attack on China, Australian Prime Minister Robert Menzies quietly told U.S. President Dwight Eisenhower, “If there is a war over Taiwan, it is your affair and not ours.” Menzies was right. He understood the distinction between U.S. objectives and Australia’s national interests.

The U.S. will never place a mass land army on the Asian mainland again. Wars cannot be won from the air alone and the U.S. will not start a nuclear contest. The stationing of 2,500 U.S. marines in northern Australia therefore appears pointless. These troops have no conceivable reason for being there. In addition, they have divided Australian public opinion unnecessarily on the vital issue of the country’s security.

Asia today presents a completely new and unique set of circumstances. The dilemmas arising from these circumstances demand new solutions, not worn-out Cold War-era notions.

By Malcolm Fraser

Malcolm Fraser is a former prime minister of Australia. ― Ed.

(Project Syndicate)