North Korea’s third nuclear test on Feb. 12 underscores the fact that little has changed surrounding one of Asia’s most worrisome flashpoints.

For the past 20 years, North Korea has conducted a string of missile and nuclear tests. Each time, the tests have been roundly condemned by members of the global community, but apart from two agreements (in 1994 and 2007) to halt Pyongyang’s advance towards a nuclear-tipped missile, the country continues its long march to deploying such a weapon.

Put differently, North Korea’s third nuclear test has put us on a road to essentially nowhere.

Yes, members of the United Nations Security Council, including China ― North Korea’s closest ally ― have roundly condemned the test, with the promise of more punitive sanctions to come.

But North Korea is already under a vise of sanctions. The truth is that sanctions have done little to change its calculus vis-a-vis nuclear weapons.

And while China has been urged to withdraw aid and trade from its southern neighbor, this is unlikely to happen. It is true that there is a love-hate relationship between Chinese leaders and their North Korean counterparts (one Chinese official once called North Korea a “spoilt child” seeking attention), but to the latter, placing too much pressure on Pyongyang risks instability in North Korea and raises the possibility of regime collapse.

All this leads us to one thing: whether it is worth the while to roll back North Korea’s nuclear program now. Nukes are the crack of international relations; once a country gets them, it is very hard for it to give up the addiction. A rare case was that of South Africa, which gave up its nuclear program in 1989.

In other words, it is time that we learnt to live with a nuclear North Korea. And if examined carefully, the prospect is not as dangerous as one would think.

It is easy to understand why North Korea seeks a nuclear capability. In the 60 years since the armistice was signed between the two Koreas in 1953, relations between powers in its neighborhood have improved substantially ― a development that has left North Korea in the cold.

China and the U.S., which fought on opposite sides during the Korean War, now have a relatively healthy working relationship. The same applies to relations between China and South Korea, Pyongyang’s bitter enemy.

Deterrence got a bum rap after the end of the Cold War, but it should hold vis-a-vis North Korea. Pyongyang pursues a nuclear capability for deterrence, not for actual use. Xinhua, the state-run Chinese news agency, put it across well: “The latest nuclear test is apparently another manifestation of the attempt of a desperate DPRK to keep threats at bay.”

Compared to Iran, which is inching towards nuclear capability, North Korea’s leaders do not practice a messianic ideology heralding the return of the 12th imam.

This does not mean that deterrence is guaranteed. Pyongyang is still years, if not decades, away from an operational nuclear-tipped missile. But in the unlikely event that Pyongyang decides to launch such a missile at the United States, the response by Washington will be swift and decisive. The same should apply should Pyongyang decide to attack South Korea or Japan in the same manner.

Like his father Kim Jong-il, Kim Jong-un seems to be effecting an image of recklessness. But it is doubtful that he entertains a death wish.

This does not mean that the global community should not try to disarm North Korea of its nascent nuclear capability.

The UNSC sanctions should be allowed to run their course. South Korean president Park Geun-hye should be given time to execute her trustpolitik policy towards the North. Privately, Chinese officials also think that North Korea can be compelled to return to the six party talks, which are largely dead.

A more innovative approach is for the U.S. to offer North Korea a path toward what it has always craved ― a permanent peace treaty and normalization of relations.

A peace guarantee and normalization formed part the ill-fated 1994 Agreed Framework as well as a similar agreement in February 2007. But Washington has been loath to offer Pyongyang a peace agreement unless it could be verified conclusively that North Korea has disarmed its nukes.

But a solution can be found. North Korea desperately seeks normalization because it perceives an existential threat from the U.S.; therein it will continue to develop a nuclear weapons capability until that threat disappears.

Prof. Bruce Cumings, a Korean historian, argues that the North has endured nuclear threats from the U.S. for decades. In October 1998, a U.S. Marine general spoke about “rolling back” North Korea, installing a South Korean occupation regime and possibly triggering the entire thing preemptively. The upshot: “We’ll kill ‘em all.”

Arguably, an offer of a peace treaty would be tantamount to appeasement; Americans would not want to give something for nothing.

But the offer of a peace treaty should be perceived as giving something now, and getting something later, in the form of North Korea’s disarmament of its nukes.

After all, states seek nuclear weapons to address deficits in their security; once such a deficit is resolved, the weapons are needed less. Joel Wit, a former U.S. State Department official, suggests that the conclusion of a peace treaty should involve the North giving up its stockpile of reactor-fuel rods.

If the U.S. and North Korea can embark on talks towards a peace treaty, the global community can then seek to address the bigger questions about the Korean peninsula ― the possibility of reunification, and whether China can accept the idea of U.S. troops staying in the peninsula, albeit in lesser numbers.

In the end, it all boils down to two options ― more North Korean nuclear or missile tests, followed by recriminations by the global community; or seeking a breakthrough that might smack of appeasement, yet offer hope for lasting peace on the peninsula.

No wonder Victor Cha, a North Korean watcher, has called North Korea the land of lousy options.

By William Choong

The writer, formerly a senior writer with The Straits Times, is a Shangri-La Dialogue (SLD) senior fellow at the International Institute for Strategic Studies (Asia), the think-tank which organizes the annual SLD. ― Ed.