MOSCOW ― In a recent speech in Berlin, U.S. President Barack Obama reaffirmed his commitment to nuclear disarmament and proposed steps toward achieving that goal. But Russia has made clear that it does not plan to pursue further reductions to its nuclear arsenal any time soon.

In the speech, Obama announced that the United States is prepared to cut its nuclear arsenal by up to one-third. He also proposed major reductions in the number of tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) deployed in Europe. Moreover, he called upon the international community to renew its efforts to prevent Iran and North Korea from developing nuclear weapons; to bring the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty and the proposed Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty into force; and to make nuclear energy safer.

Three years ago, Russia seemed to share Obama’s aspiration to move beyond Cold War nuclear postures, with both countries agreeing to limit their deployed weapons to 1,550 as part of the New Strategic Arms-Reduction Treaty. In fact, Russia considers New START to be a “gold standard” treaty, based on core principles that should be applied to all future arms-control treaties.

But Russian officials have since reaffirmed their hardline position, stating in various settings ― including at the recent European Security Conference in Moscow ― that Russia will not consider further cuts to its nuclear arsenal until the U.S. addresses certain issues affecting Russian interests.

One of Russia’s main concerns is America’s efforts to build up its ballistic missile defense system (BMDS). Although experts have disputed the capacity of America’s BMDS, Russian leaders remain convinced that it could seriously undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.

Russian officials intimate that the U.S. is using the threat of a North Korean or Iranian attack on the U.S. with nuclear-armed ballistic missiles as a pretext to erect defenses against Russia (and probably China). Despite Obama’s assurances (and those of his predecessors), Russia asserts that America’s BMDS is actually intended to expand NATO’s role in Europe.

Russian President Vladimir Putin has even warned that, left unchallenged by Russia’s nuclear deterrent, the U.S. would be tempted to intervene militarily in more countries, as it did in the former Yugoslavia, Iraq, and Libya. These concerns have driven Russia to demand that the U.S. sign a binding treaty that limits the speed, location, and capabilities of its missile defenses and includes mandatory transparency provisions.

Another issue constraining nuclear disarmament is Russia’s view that, without nuclear weapons, its military capabilities would be no match for the conventional forces of the U.S. and NATO. Indeed, many in Russia worry that a U.S. attack against Russia’s nuclear deterrent and other defense assets that relies on America’s growing stock of long-range, precision-guided conventional weapons would be as devastating as a nuclear strike.

These fears are exacerbated by Obama’s declared intention to work alongside NATO in seeking to reduce by as many as 5,000 Russia’s arsenal of TNWs ― which dwarfs NATO’s holdings of roughly 200 ― and to have the remaining warheads relocated away from NATO members’ territory. Many in Russia view their country’s dominance in this area as essential to offsetting imbalances in conventional weaponry.

In fact, no formal arms-control treaty directly covers these non-strategic weapons; nor have they been the subject of targeted NATO-Russia negotiations.

Even if the U.S. managed to get Russia to the negotiating table, convincing it to accept sizable cuts in its TNWs arsenal could require the U.S. to fulfill additional demands, such as limiting NATO’s military concentrations and facilities near Russia’s periphery and resurrecting the Treaty on Conventional Armed Forces in Europe on the Kremlin’s terms. Moreover, Russian leaders demand that other nuclear-armed states accept comparable limits on their TNWs stocks.

Indeed, Russia wants to replace the predominately bilateral nuclear arms-control processes of the last 50 years with multilateral negotiations aimed at constraining the offensive capabilities of other nuclear states, including the United Kingdom, France, and China ― and maybe other countries. But convincing these states to participate in arms-reduction negotiations, much less to accept new constraints on their relatively small nuclear arsenals, would be difficult. Like the Obama administration, they believe that the next round of cuts should focus on Russia and the U.S., which still possess almost all the world’s nuclear weapons.

The fundamental challenge is that Russia’s leaders do not share Obama’s aversion to nuclear weapons. On the contrary, they believe that, while the likelihood of a nuclear war has fallen sharply since the end of the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has become more valuable for Russia and other countries that are outmatched by America’s conventional military power. This might prove to be an insurmountable obstacle to realizing the Obama administration’s vision of a nuclear-weapons-free world.

By Richard Weitz 

Richard Weitz is senior fellow and director of the Center for Political-Military Analysis at the Hudson Institute. ― Ed.

(Project Syndicate)