The Republic of Korea proves to have one of the loosest systems regarding military secrets among nations with strong armed forces. Its court also deserves note for its leniency on cases involving leak of military secrets, quite discomforting fact in a country that faces constant threats from a most belligerent adversary on its border.
Media research following the indictment last week of a retired Air Force general on charges of passing classified information to an American arms supplier have exposed broad and close-knit connections between reservist officers and arms businesses. Regulations restricting retired officers from taking civilian jobs in the areas of military procurement were conveniently ignored, and at least 329 such reservists were employed by 57 companies between 2005 and 2010. There were 124 former civilian employees at the Defense Ministry and its procurement agency who moved to arms supplier firms between 2008 and 2011.
Supreme Court records show that out of the 37 reservist officers who were tried in 26 cases of leaking military secrets since 2004, not a single defendant received a prison term: 31 were given probation, four got a suspended sentence, one was fined and one acquitted. Judges usually cited “no real danger to national security,” noting that the classified information was transferred to firms of friendly nations.
Retired Gen. Kim Sang-tae, the former ROK Air Force chief of staff, has represented the Korea office of Lockheed Martin since 1995. He is accused of conveying 12 items of confidential information on arms requirements of the Air Force to Lockheed Martin staff. He will probably be given a suspended sentence if our judges follow precedents. In his case, the court may recognize his remarkable contributions to national defense while on active service as a further extenuating condition.
The ultimate remedial steps should be taken by the legislature. In revising the Criminal Code and the Military Secrets Protection Law to provide heavier punishment for detection and transfer of classified information either for allies or enemies, lawmakers need to study the case of Robert Kim, a Korean-American employee at the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. The U.S. court sentenced him to nine years in jail and a three-year probation for passing classified information to a military attache at the Korean Embassy in Washington in 1996.
Media research following the indictment last week of a retired Air Force general on charges of passing classified information to an American arms supplier have exposed broad and close-knit connections between reservist officers and arms businesses. Regulations restricting retired officers from taking civilian jobs in the areas of military procurement were conveniently ignored, and at least 329 such reservists were employed by 57 companies between 2005 and 2010. There were 124 former civilian employees at the Defense Ministry and its procurement agency who moved to arms supplier firms between 2008 and 2011.
Supreme Court records show that out of the 37 reservist officers who were tried in 26 cases of leaking military secrets since 2004, not a single defendant received a prison term: 31 were given probation, four got a suspended sentence, one was fined and one acquitted. Judges usually cited “no real danger to national security,” noting that the classified information was transferred to firms of friendly nations.
Retired Gen. Kim Sang-tae, the former ROK Air Force chief of staff, has represented the Korea office of Lockheed Martin since 1995. He is accused of conveying 12 items of confidential information on arms requirements of the Air Force to Lockheed Martin staff. He will probably be given a suspended sentence if our judges follow precedents. In his case, the court may recognize his remarkable contributions to national defense while on active service as a further extenuating condition.
The ultimate remedial steps should be taken by the legislature. In revising the Criminal Code and the Military Secrets Protection Law to provide heavier punishment for detection and transfer of classified information either for allies or enemies, lawmakers need to study the case of Robert Kim, a Korean-American employee at the U.S. Office of Naval Intelligence. The U.S. court sentenced him to nine years in jail and a three-year probation for passing classified information to a military attache at the Korean Embassy in Washington in 1996.