For those who have not noticed, Russia has steadily been increasing its cooperation with North Korea. The first major event happened in 2014, when Moscow moved to forgive about $11 billion worth of Soviet-era debt.

Trade between the two nations has been on the rise and this month, a new ferry service began from Vladivostok, providing a cargo capacity of 6,000 tons each month. In April, it was even reported that Russian military equipment was being transported into North Korea. No matter how one looks at this, it would appear Russia is working to develop a relationship.

Perhaps more significant than the movement of weapons was the announcement in March that Russia was expanding the number of North Korean laborers allowed to enter its country. This is significant since overseas laborers are a significant source of income for the North Korean state. Such laborers are tasked with sending home portions of their earnings to fund the government.

In January, representatives from state-owned Russian Railways visited Pyongyang as well, proposing plans for a new railway and an education program to teach North Korean students at Russian universities.

With Chinese-North Korean relations having soured in recent months, it is not surprising to see North Korea demonstrating receptiveness to the possibility of a new patron. Recent threats from China to cut off fuel exports and its suspension of North Korean coal imports have prompted Pyongyang state media to go so far as accuse China of “betrayal.” Such harsh language does not bode well for those hoping China can convince North Korea to abandon its nuclear program. If anything, they reaffirm China’s desire to reduce tensions, an aim apparently at odds with Pyongyang’s desires.

Some analysts believe Russia’s intervention in the region might make denuclearization easier in the long run. These analysts suggest a Western voice with more influence over Pyongyang would be more effective in stabilizing the region. Personally, I find such opinions to contain a hint of racism in that they suggest Western diplomacy is somehow superior or preferred to the Asian alternative. Given recent evidence, I see nothing in support of this idea, at least not yet.

Other analysts suggest Russia’s decision to court North Korea is part of a wider plan to disrupt US influence in the region, much like Russia’s strategy in Syria. In this sense, Pyongyang and Moscow have much in common as the US is the sworn, public enemy of North Korea. Having more influence on the Korean Peninsula could potentially weaken South Korea’s alliance with the US, forcing Seoul to deal more with Russia in an effort to relieve tensions.

If Russia could, for example, deliver a peaceful resolution to missile tests or halt nuclear development, it is not inconceivable Seoul would be willing to pay some price for it, perhaps something economic (a trade deal with Russia or Pyongyang) or diplomatic (rejection of THAAD or removal of a US base). It is difficult to see Seoul breaking off its alliance with the US entirely, but recent interactions with Trump do leave much to be desired, offering Moscow room to maneuver.

Another interesting angle in this situation is the unresolved Kuril Islands land dispute between Russia and Japan. For all effective purposes, Russia currently controls the land in dispute and a 1951 treaty signed by Japan and the Allies (but not by Russia) formerly renounces Japan’s claims to the islands. Because of the rich fisheries in that region, the Japanese government has worked diligently in recent years to maintain public awareness about the dispute, focusing attention on the 17,000 Japanese residents who were evicted from the islands at the end of World War II, when Russian forces captured them. The goal of reclaiming these northern territories has been one of Prime Minister Abe’s official goals for some time now. An expansion of Russian influence in Korea may also be Moscow’s way of balancing out Japan’s expanding military influence in the north Pacific.


By Justin Fendos

Justin Fendos is a professor at Dongseo University in South Korea and the associate director of the Tan School at Fudan University in Shanghai. -- Ed.