The next U.S. government may shift from its North Korea policy called “strategic patience,” which has so far failed to curb the communist regime’s nuclear program and lacked a grand vision, said a U.S. scholar.

John Ikenberry, a political scientist at Princeton University, also noted that South Korea, the U.S. and Japan need to move forward with tougher sanctions against North Korea despite China’s apparent reluctance.
 

Korea Herald: China’s policy toward North Korea seems unchanged despite its behavior. Because of this, there has been a lot of frustration here in Seoul with senior Seoul officials stressing China’s “active” role. Would China ever alter its policy?

John Ikenberry: I think South Korea, the U.S. and Japan have to go forward together regardless of what China does. I think the three countries need to coordinate their responses, while providing what we will call an “off-ramp,” an ability to engage North Korea on alternatives to this future of being increasingly tightened and contained by outside regional states.

In addition to that, one needs to try to invite China to join the efforts to speak as an international community to North Korea, saying that the international community symbolized the U.N. resolution and the sanctions that are in place and being proposed. These are signals that the international community is united in its efforts to convince North Korea to step back from what it is doing

So I think the three countries need to speak together on responding to North Korea, inviting China to join them, but reserving their own policy choices to respond to what is going on in Pyongyang. So the effort to convince China to do more partly involves other countries doing more.


KH: There have been concerns that President Park Geun-hye’s efforts to strengthen ties with Beijing would undercut the South Korea-U.S. alliance. Do you agree?

Ikenberry: No. I don’t. After all, the U.S. is engaging with China. The U.S. under Obama has important meetings with (China's) President Xi (Jinping) and has charted agenda for cooperation. So it is not surprising that South Korea would want to do the same thing.

So there aren’t misunderstandings. We can leverage each other’s position and make both countries go forward better. I think that the ultimate goal is to have a stable set of alliances and have a stable relationship between Korea and China.

It can create contradictions and tension with the U.S. But it doesn’t need to. The more China is comfortable with changes on the Korean Peninsula, the better for everybody because it means that China, knowing that it has good relations with South Korea, can step aside and let the unification occur.


KH: How do you foresee the next administration’s North Korea policy given the frustration over Washington’s strategic patience policy?

Ikenberry: I think the policy of strategic patience is coming to an end. Now that we will have a new president, there will be a review of policy. I suspect there will be new efforts to move toward putting pressure on North Korea, trying to work with allies and trying to encourage China to do more.

I think that most people who are looking at this issue don’t find any good options. Engagement doesn’t work, sanctions don’t work and relying on China to solve the problem doesn’t work. So I think that provides an impetus for strategic patience. It has not been a policy that has had a great vision behind it.


KH: Some pundits have claimed that the U.S. had not taken North Korea seriously and instead shifted the blame for North Korea’s nuclear development onto China. What do you think?

Ikenberry: I think that is wrong. The Obama administration takes North Korea very seriously. It began its administration with an outreach to North Korea. And North Korea snubbed Washington’s overtures and tested a nuclear weapon.

So I think it is a misreading of what Washington has hoped for. The Obama administration has -- more than any administration in recent history -- said that diplomacy matters. So how can you then blame the U.S. for not wanting to talk? The administration would be eager to do so with even a glimmer of hope.

I think that the reality is that China is going to have to be a part of the solution. We should not wait for China to “solve” the problem. But when the problem gets solved, China is right there in the middle of the solution and it has to be because it is the ultimate lifeline of North Korea.

So China is in a position where they can decide how much pressure North Korea feels and how much North Korea will experience for defying the wishes of that international community. China can do that. No other countries can do that.


KH: South Korea’s ruling party's floor leader suggested that South Korea acquire nuclear weapons for self-defense. What is your opinion on South Korea’s nuclear armament?

Ikenberry: I think South Korean’s acquisition of nuclear weapon would be a big mistake. As North Korea becomes more threatening, China has an interest in constraining North Korea’s nuclear development. The last thing China wants is to see South Korea and Japan get nuclear weapons.


KH: How do you assess President Park’s North Korea policy? Her administration has pushed for a peninsular trust-building process that aims to restore ties with Pyongyang, though it has been unfruitful.

Ikenberry: I think it is smart to pursue a double policy of both putting pressure on North Korea in the wake of its provocative actions (while) signaling a willingness to talk and articulating a way in which North Korea could find a more normal relationship with South Korea and the other countries in Northeast Asia.

So I think we have to be both hard and soft. You have to both put more pressure on North Korea and simultaneously engage with them. During the Cold War with the Soviet Union, the United States was pursuing military buildup, but it was simultaneously reaching out for willingness to talk.


KH: Since a compromise last December between Seoul and Tokyo over the issue of the latter’s wartime sexual enslavement of Korean women, there has been backlash from victims refusing to accept the deal, which they have called “diplomatic collusion.” How do you view the situation?

Ikenberry: While it is notable that the two leaders are trying to bring the issue to a rest, it seems to me much more is needed on the Japanese side and from the Abe government. It seems to me that we need to help bring the wider factions in his right-wing around to a new and authentic understanding of the history, which would entail not flirting with revisionist narratives of the Japanese Imperial era.

On the Korean side, I think the NGO and the human rights communities need to be brought into the process so that they too feel like they are being a part of the settlement. And so it seems to me that both governments have more work to do and each needs to help the other. I think there needs to be a process to put in place for more interaction between the two countries on the issue.

The big mistake would to say that “the two foreign ministries met, they came to an understanding and the issue has been settled.” And the language even speaks like that. “Final and irrevocable” sounds like the language of a national security agreement, as opposed to an agreement that is sensitive to deep social scars that exist.


KH: Do you think it is likely that countries in Northeast Asia will build a NATO-like multilateral security regime in near future?

Ikenberry: I don’t think a multilateral security regime in East Asia is realistic in the near future because of a very real traditional security threat that exists. (Some are) driven by North Korea and by the growing military size of China. (So) the alliances will still be necessary.

But that doesn’t mean that there can’t be a layer cake of institutions. Indeed, there already are such institutions in East Asia. You have bilateral alliances, various kinds of multilateral security forums -- from ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) regional forums to perhaps Northeast Asia regional security framework based on the six party talks.

My view is that it is not an “either-or” situation. It is going to be a layer cake of types of institutions. And some of them will be based on shared democracy working together with shared values and some of them will be based on more traditional geopolitical and realpolitik logic.

So I think we should not expect in the short term a kind of NATO that includes all countries in Asia. I think that is unrealistic in the short term. We should expect that a lot of difference types of instituitions that will simultaneously work to promote understanding, reassurance and transparency.

By Yeo Jun-suk (jasonyeo@heraldcorp.com)

John Ikenberry
● John Ikenberry is a professor of politics and international affairs at the Department of Politics at Princeton University and the Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs. He is also a Global Eminence Scholar at Kyung Hee University in Seoul.
● He has authored numerous essays and books including “Liberal Leviathan ― The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American System” (2011,) and “After Victory ― Institutions, Strategic Restraint, and the Rebuilding of Order after Major Wars” (2001).