Traditionally, Koreans have respected polite and considerate speech, but recently, we have seen many people speaking arrogantly and presumptuously. A recent case involves Kim Tae-hyo, the first deputy director of the National Security Office, whose remarks have ignited controversy. He made unusually frank comments on US elections and foreign policy during a seminar at a private research institute in Seoul.

Here are a few of his statements: “If former President Trump wins the US election in November, the US security umbrella could weaken,” “Since Vice President Harris' advisers merely assisted her, I am concerned whether they can show strong charisma if she becomes president. I feel like I’ll need to teach them,” “It takes time to learn the job, so I think it would be easier for us to work with the US if she brings in heavyweight veterans from outside to form a stronger foreign policy team.”

Kim's remarks are highly inappropriate and diplomatic slight especially from the most influential adviser to the president of South Korea. There are at least three key reasons. First, his words imply interference in another country’s internal affairs. Second, there are factual misunderstandings. Third, he showed a lack of contextual understanding regarding the world of politics. The problem with Kim's errors and misjudgments is not simply the ignorance or arrogance of an individual academic but the potential damage to the Korea-US alliance. To maintain the Korea-US alliance in the highest level, we need to clarify what is wrong with the remarks.

Kim's comments include an evaluation of candidates in the US presidential election, which inherently contains bias. Predicting that the US security umbrella would weaken if Trump wins and expressing support for Vice President Harris’ focus on alliances suggests a bias in favor of Harris. For a high-ranking official from South Korea, a key US ally, to mention the dangers of Trump's victory could work against Trump’s campaign. If Trump recognizes this, it could create a precarious situation for Korea's US policies and Korea-US relations.

A diplomatic blunder in September 2016 by then-Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe offers insight into the color of Kim's potential mistake. Abe attended the UN General Assembly in New York and met with then-Democratic presidential candidate Hillary Clinton. A photo of their meeting was posted on social media, giving the impression that Abe publicly supported Clinton. We don’t know whether the photo became a factor in the election or not. However, we know that Trump's camp got angry. Right after Trump secured his unexpected victory, Abe rushed to New York to meet him without even confirming an appointment. Abe appeared extremely submissive during the meeting, probably asking for forgiveness for his meddling in the US election. Only after gifting Trump a gold-plated golf club post-inauguration did Abe receive cordial treatment, though he endured mockery as Trump’s “poodle.”

The second issue with Kim's remarks lies in factual inaccuracies. His statement that Harris’ foreign policy advisers need more experience and collaboration with veterans to do their job needs to be explained. Harris' top foreign policy adviser, Dr. Philip Gordon, is a well-known veteran. He served as the White House director for European affairs during the Clinton administration and spent a decade at the Brookings Institution. He was the assistant secretary of state for European and Eurasia affairs for four years and then moved to the special assistant to president Obama. Recognized as a seasoned expert on regional affairs and Washington politics by the media as early as 2013, he is currently serving as Harris’ national security adviser in the Biden administration.

The claim that Harris' advisers lack charisma likely stems from their approach that the US looks arrogant in world society, so the US should take a humble attitude in foreign issues, which Dr. Gordon and his deputy, Dr. Rebecca Lissner, also share. Misunderstanding humility and caution as a lack of charisma merely shows a shallow and reckless perspective.

The third issue is the assumption that Harris's team will need more charisma if she wins the presidency, despite not knowing whom she might appoint as her top advisor. Figures like Philip Gordon and Jake Sullivan are never lightweight experts. There are bunch of famous experts in the US and they are doing some intense competition now for the high-ranking jobs, including national security adviser and secretary of state. A crucial point at this juncture is that nobody knows whom Harris wants for the big posts after her victory, and possibility is open to anybody.

A brief story involving former South Korean President Park Chung-hee teaches us never to prejudge the future of ambitious politicians. In 1965, former US President Richard Nixon visited Korea after the consecutive election defeats in 1960 for president and in 1962 for California governor. Although there was a recommendation to host a banquet for Nixon, South Korean President Park, seeing Nixon as a political has-been or an underdog, neglected him, offering only a cup of coffee at the Blue House. Nixon's political comeback in 1968 shocked Park. Later, when Park sought a summit to mend relations with him, Nixon openly humiliated him by meeting in a private hotel while on vacation. Nixon didn’t tell him about the sensitive discussions on the US-China rapprochement or decisions on US troop withdrawals from Korea. After the bitter moments, Park was known to pursue nuclear armament, creating diplomatic friction with the US until his eventual assassination in 1979.

The futures of politicians and high-ranking officials are difficult to predict, and Kim's presumption about Harris’ team's charisma reflects a need for historical awareness. Ignorance, arrogance and prejudice in a single person may be forgivable, but when these traits harm national interests, the consequences are far more severe. Kim is better off focusing on things about Korea and himself rather than trying to teach American elites or consider the minds of Japanese people.

Wang Son-taek

Wang Son-taek is an adjunct professor at Sogang University. He is a former diplomatic correspondent at YTN and a former research associate at Yeosijae. The views expressed here are the writer’s own. -- Ed.